User convenience and strong security are often at odds, and most security applications need to nd some sort of balance between these two (often opposing) goals. The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), a security infrastructure built on top of interdomain routing, is not immune to this issue. The RPKI uses the maxLength attribute to reduce the amount of information that must be explicitly recorded in its cryptographic objects. MaxLength also allows operators to easily recon gure their networks without modifying their RPKI objects. Our network measurements, however, suggest that the maxLength attribute strikes the wrong balance between security and user convenience. We therefore believe that operators should avoid using maxLength. We give operational recommendations and develop software that allow operators to reap many of the bene ts of maxLength without its security costs.
INTRODUCTION
E orts to secure interdomain routing with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) have been ongoing for decades. To date, however, the RPKI [14] is the only approach that has seen widespread deployment [20] . The IETF is diligently working towards standardizing BGPsec [13] , a more robust security enhancement that should be deployed on top of the RPKI. BGPsec calls for a wholesale replacement of BGP and heavyweight online cryptography, while providing meagre bene ts in partial deployment [16] . Thus, it seems likely that it will take years before BGPsec deployment becomes a reality.
We therefore consider a setting where the RPKI is deployed, but BGPsec is not. Even in this setting, network operators can reap valuable security bene ts [11, 16] by dropping routes that the RPKI deems invalid. By doing this, operators can prevent some of Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. However, RPKI objects have an attribute called maxLength, and when maxLength is miscon gured, it obviates most of the RPKI's security bene ts. Speci cally, an RPKI object with a miscon gured maxLength is vulnerable to a forged-origin subpre x hijack (an attack that was rst outlined in [9] ). We point out that this attack is as harmful as the traditional subpre x hijack that the RPKI is designed to prevent. We nd that these miscon gurations are common: our network measurements con rm that the vast majority of RPKI objects that use maxLength in the wild are vulnerable to this attack. We argue that the RPKI RFCs are not su ciently consistent on the limitations of maxLength. We also show how most of the bene ts attained through maxLength can be achieved without exposing users to attacks, and present open-source software that achieves this goal. We conclude with operational recommendations for the use of maxLength.
HOW THE RPKI SECURES BGP
We use a running example to review how the RPKI secures routing.
ROAs. The RPKI uses Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) to create a trusted mapping from an IP pre x to a set of autonomous systems (ASes) that are authorized to originate (i.e., claim to be the destination for) this pre x. Each ROA contains a set S of IP pre xes, and the identifying number of an AS authorized to originate all the IP pre xes in S; the ROA is cryptographically signed by the party that is authorized to allocate these IP pre xes.
For our running example, we use IP pre x 168.122.0.0/16 which contains all IPv4 addresses from 168.122.0.0 to 168.122.255.255. This IP pre x is allocated to Boston University (BU) which also has AS 111. Therefore, the RPKI should contain a ROA with the IP pre x 168.122.0.0/16 mapped to AS 111. This ROA would be digitally signed by a key that is certi ed by ARIN (the American Registry for Internet Numbers), the registry that allocated this IP pre x to BU. It is also possible for an organization like BU to sign its own ROAs using cryptographic keys held by BU and certi ed by the ARIN [14] . Today, however, most organizations choose to con gure their ROAs through a user interface provided by their Regional Internet Registry (RIR), (i.e., AfriNIC [3] , APNIC [4] , ARIN [5] , LACNIC [12] , RIPE [23] ). The backend of each interface generates and then digitally signs the ROA using the RIR's secret keys, and then makes the ROA available to the Internet at large.
ROAs protect against some of the most harmful routing attacks; namely, pre x and subpre x hijacks where a hijacking AS originates ("hijacks") routes for IP pre xes that it is not authorized to originate. [20] indicates that 7.6% of the (pre x, origin AS) pairs announced in BGP match a ROA in the RPKI. Meanwhile, very few ASes make routing decisions based on the validation state of a route according to ROAs in the RPKI [9, 22] . In the absence of the RPKI, the hijacker would intercept tra c for all addresses in 168.122.0.0/24-rather than owing to AS 111, all this tra c would ow to AS m instead. This is because routers perform a longest-pre x match when deciding where to forward IP packets. A packet with destination IP 168.122.0.1 will ow to attacker AS m, rather than to AS 111, because 168.122.0.0/24 is a longer matching pre x than 168.122.0.0/16. This attack is highly e ective, since the location of the attacker or the path he announces is irrelevant. All that matters is that the hijacker's route for the subpre x propagates out into the global Internet. Longest-pre x-match routing ensures that the hijacked route is always preferred over the legitimate route. This behavior has been exploited in several high-pro le incidents [18, 21] . (2) there is no ROA matching the attacker's announcement (i.e., ROA for AS m and IP pre x 168.122.0.0/24). If routers ignore invalid BGP announcements, the subpre x hijack will fail, and the attacker fails to intercept tra c destined to BU at AS 111.
ENTER MAXLENGTH
We continue with our example to understand maxLength.
De-aggregation. In addition to originating the BGP announcement for 168.122.0.0/16, AS 111 also originates an additional BGP announcement for its subpre x: "168.122.225.0/24: AS 111" Announcing subpre xes of a larger pre x from the same AS is known as de-aggregation, and sometimes used for tra c engineering. By announcing the /24 pre x to some neighbors and not others, AS 111 has some modicum of control over the routes other ASes use to reach 168.122.225.0/24. 1 However, de-aggregation tends to bloat the size of routing tables across all routers on the Internet. As such, network operators frown upon excessive de-aggregation, e.g., announcing all 2 8 of the /24s constituting a /16 [25] . Using maxLength to deal with de-aggregation. The RPKI's maxLength attribute provides one solution to this problem. According to RFC 6482 [15] : "When present, the maxLength speci es the maximum length of the IP address pre x that the AS is authorized to advertise." Thus, suppose we modi ed the ROA by adding a maxLength of 24 Minimal ROAs. A ROA is minimal [17, §3.2] when it includes only those pre xes that the AS announces in BGP, and no other pre xes. The ROA above is minimal, because it includes exactly the two pre xes announced by AS 111. Minimal ROAs come with less exibility, because the AS must know exactly what pre xes it plans to announce at the time the ROA is issued.
FORGED-ORIGIN SUBPREFIX HIJACK
The convenience of maxLength comes with a serious downside. Speci cally, when maxLength is used to issue ROAs that are not minimal, these ROAs are subject to a forged-origin subpre x hijack. This attack is as e ective as the traditional subpre x hijack that ROAs are designed to prevent. Forged origin subpre x hijacks were outlined in [9] . In this paper we focus on evaluating the bene ts of using maxLength in light of this attack, and showing that comparable bene ts can be attained without exposing networks to forged origin subpre x hijacks.
Why does this attack work? (1) The hijacker's BGP announcement falsely claims that m is a neighbor of AS 111. But other ASes and routers have no way to know that this is false, because the RPKI does not provide a means to validate this claim (and BGPsec is not deployed in our setting). It's as bad as a subpre x hijack! Thus, if the hijacker's route propagates through the Internet, the hijacker will intercept all tra c destined for IP addresses in 168.122.0.0/24. Thus, the attack has exactly the same impact as a regular subpre x hijack. And a regular subpre x hijack is more damaging than a pre x hijack. Indeed, one might argue that the whole point of the RPKI is to stop subpre x hijacks [14, 16] .
What's di erent? An expert reader might wonder about the di erence between the forged-origin subpre x hijack and the traditional forged-origin hijack [11, 16] . In a traditional forged-origin hijack, the hijacker also (1) falsely claims to be a neighbor of the legitimate origin AS, and (2) announces a route that is valid according to the RPKI. However, because it is traditionally assumed that the RPKI only authorizes routes that are announced in BGP, the hijacker's route is for the exact same pre x that is legitimately announced in BGP. Thus, the forged-origin hijacker m would announce:
"168.122.0.0/16: AS m, AS 111" Now, the hijacker's route is not the only route to the hijacked pre x. Rather than attracting all of the victim's tra c, the tra c must split between the hijacker's route and the legitimate route. This subtlety makes a huge di erence in the e ectiveness of the attack. [16] shows that, during a traditional forged-origin hijack, the majority of tra c (on average) is still forwarded on the legitimate route. Meanwhile, when non-minimal ROAs authorize routes that are not announced in BGP, a forged-origin subpre x hijack on these routes causes all of the tra c to be intercepted by the hijacker.
Who is vulnerable? Any pre x in a non-minimal ROA is vulnerable. In particular, any pre x p in a ROA with maxLength m longer than p is vulnerable, unless every subpre x of p of length m is legitimately announced in BGP.
WHAT DO THE RFCS SAY?
RFC 7115 [6] mentions minimal ROAs: One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack does not work for sub-pre xes that are not covered by overly long max length. They must attack the whole /16, which is more likely to be noticed because of its size. Note that "attacking the whole /16" is not only "more likely to be noticed", but also much less e ective than a forged-origin subpre xhijack against 10.0.666.0/24. To see why, return to our running example and suppose that BU had the minimal ROA described at the end of §3. Then, a forged-origin subpre x hijack on 168.122.0.0/24 (as described in §4) would fail, since this minimal ROA ensures that the hijacker's route is invalid. Thus, the hijacker m would need to "attack the whole /16", using a traditional forged-origin hijack announcement:
"168.122.0.0/16: AS m, AS 111" As remarked in §4, this causes tra c to split between the hijacker m and the legitimate AS 111, with the majority of ASes choosing to route by the legitimate path (see [16] ). Unlike the forged-origin subpre x hijack, this attack does not allow the hijacker to attract all of the tra c, and is thus signi cantly less e ective [16] . RFC 7115 [6] also o ers this solid advice:
Operators should be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. For example, if a pre x will have only a few sub-pre xes announced, multiple ROAs for the speci c announcements should be used as opposed to one ROA with a long max length. but we note that "multiple ROAs" are not required since ROAs support sets of IP pre xes.
RFC6907 similarly recommends issuing minimal ROAs [17, §3.2], but also suggests [17, §3.8] using a non-minimal ROA (that is vulnerable to a forged-origin subpre x hijacks) when ASes wish to deaggregate pre xes per our description in §3.
BENEFITS OF MAXLENGTH?
We use network measurements to analyze the impact of the maxLength attribute. We downloaded all ROAs from the RPKI publication Problem: Using maxLength almost always creates vulnerabilities. First, we observe that only 4630 (about 12%) of the prexes in ROAs have a maxLength longer than the pre x length. The vast majority of these ROAs are not minimal. Speci cally, almost all of these pre xes (84%) are not minimal, and thus vulnerable to forged-origin subpre x hijacks. To measure this, we counted the number of pre xes p with maxLength m longer than p, where some subpre x of p up to length m is not announced in BGP. Thus, we see that almost all users 'taking advantage' of the maxLength feature are opening themselves up to attacks.
Bene t? Fewer pre xes included in ROAs. One might argue that a bene t of maxLength is that it reduces the number of ROAs. We now argue this is not a signi cant bene t.
In our dataset, 40K pre xes are authorized by ROAs. What if (1) maxLength is eliminated and (2) only minimal ROAs were used? Then, we nd that 13K additional pre xes would need to be added to ROAs. (To obtain this number, we count the number of pre xes that are (a) announced in BGP, and (b) are also a covered by a pre x that is authorized by a ROA in the RPKI.) We stress, however, that we could deal with these 13K additional pre xes without adding any additional ROAs (and associated cryptographic material) to the RPKI: we just convert each original non-minimal ROA to a minimal ROA that has the set of pre xes announced in BGP.
Bene t? Reducing load on routers. One might argue that maxLength reduces load on routers. We nd that holds in today's scenario (where the RPKI is partially deployed), but not if the RPKI is fully deployed. Figure 1 shows how routers get information from the RPKI. Each AS has a trusted local cache (typically a general-purpose machine) that downloads the complete set of ROAs from all default RPKI repositories. The local cache cryptographically validates the ROAs and creates a list of "Protocol Data Units" (PDUs). Each PDU is essentially a tuple of (IP pre x, maxLength, origin AS) [7, 19] . The local cache sends the PDU list to the routers in its AS using the (RPKI-to-Router) protocol [1] . Finally, routers use the PDU list to determine validity of BGP announcements [1, 7, 19] .
The PDU list could become longer if we replace all non-minimal maxLength-using ROAs with minimal ROAs that do not use maxLength. For instance, a single maxLength-using PDU for pre x 87.254.32.0/19-21 (shown in Figure 1 ), would be replaced with four non-maxLengthusing PDUs (i.e., one PDU for each subpre x of 87.254.32.0/19 up to length /21, that is announced in BGP). This could impact performance at routers. The measurements described above indicate that today's routers would need to process 13K additional PDUs (a 33% increase). Thus, in today's scenario (where the RPKI is partially deployed), we nd that maxLength does reduce the number of PDUs processed by routers. Yet, the number of PDUs is not very high.
Does this nding hold if the RPKI was fully deployed? To nd out, we suppose that every IP pre x in our BGP dataset was covered by a maximally-permissive ROA. A maximally-permissive ROA authorizes each of its pre xes to the longest possible maxLength: namely, every IPv4 pre x has maxLength /32, while every IPv6 pre x has maxLength /128. (Maximally-permissive ROAs are vulnerable to forged-origin subpre x hijacks; we use them only to bound the maximum compression provided by maxLength.) Our BGP dataset has 777K advertised (IP pre x, AS) pairs (IPv4 and IPv6 pre xes). If all of these pairs were covered by maximally-permissive ROAs, these ROAs would still need to include 729K pre xes! Thus, in the full-deployment scenario, the maximum compression provided by the maxLength (in terms of reducing the number of PDUs processed by routers) is just 6.2%. This follows because most ASes do not send BGP announcements for subpre xes of their pre xes.
Next, we present software that we built to pre-process the PDU list to reduce the number additional PDUs without introducing vulnerabilities to forged-origin subpre x hijacks. Our software achieves a compression rate of 6.1% in the same full-deployment scenario, very close to the above 6.2% bound.
COMPRESSING MINIMAL ROAS
Recall that a router validating routes against the RPKI is given a list of PDUs, where each is a tuple of (IP pre x, maxLength, origin AS) from a ROA [7, 19] . The list of PDUs is created by the trusted local cache, as shown in Figure 1 . Thus, to avoid pushing a longer list of PDUs to routers, we now present software that runs on the local cache, and transforms a list of PDUs that do not use the maxLength attribute into a list of PDUs that do. Because it runs on the local cache, our software requires no changes to routers and conforms with today's RPKI architecture. Our software is publicly available [24] .
Build your own maxLength. Conceptually, our software compresses a set of ROAs that do not use maxLength to a set of ROAs that do use maxLength. Consider the following minimal ROA:
ROA 
Software architecture
Today's RPKI Tools contain a utility program called scan_roas that the local cache uses to transform a set of ROAs that have been downloaded from the RPKI and cryptographically validated, into a list of PDUs, aka, (IP pre x, maxLength, origin AS) tuples [1] . Our utility is called compress_roas and acts as a drop-in alternative to scan_roas. compress_roas rst calls scan_roas on a set of cryptographically-validated ROAs, and obtains a set of valid (IP pre x, maxLength, origin AS)-tuples. Then, we compress this set of tuples to another set of tuples that do use the maxLength attribute.
Compression algorithm. Our algorithm takes in a list of (IP pre x, maxLength, AS)-tuples and compresses it using tries (i.e., pre x trees) as shown in Figure 2 . For each AS number in the list, we generate a trie for IPv4 and a trie for IPv6. The key to each trie is the string $pre x where $ is a delimiter, and pre x is a binary representation of an IP pre x and its length. Each trie node corresponds to some (AS, pre x, maxLength)-tuple in a valid ROA. The value of the trie node is the maxLength speci ed in the tuple. If the tuple came from a ROA that does not use the maxLength attribute, then the trie node's maxLength value is identical to the pre x length.
For a trie node with key $k, we refer to the shortest-keyed nodes with pre x $k ||0 and $k ||1 as its left and right direct children. A trie node can therefore have at most two direct children.
To compress tuples, we iterate through the trie using a depthrst search (DFS). As the DFS backtracks through the trie we run the compression function in Algorithm 1. Each trie node is assigned a new value (i.e., a maxLength) if both its direct children exist. The assigned maxLength of the node is the minimum maxLength of its two children. The child is then deleted if the child's maxLength does not exceed the parent's maxLength. When the DFS completes, we get a set of (IP pre x, maxLength, AS)-tuples that correspond to the remaining trie nodes.
Performance
We evaluate our software both in today's RPKI partial deployment status, and in a future scenario where RPKI is fully deployed. We use datasets that aggregates ROAs and BGP advertisements on a weekly basis, from 4/13/2017 to 6/1/2017. Figure 3 presents results across all datasets. Table 1 and the discussion below is for the 6/1/2017 dataset. See [24] for details on how to reproduce our results.
Today's RPKI. Our dataset has 7499 ROAs, comprising 39,949 distinct tuples of (IP pre x, maxLength, AS). Each tuple is inserted into one of the tries and compressed with compress_roas. The result is 33,615 tuples, for a compression of 15.90%. Thus, our software is bene cial even for today's (maxLength-using) RPKI. Today's RPKI, however, is vulnerable to forged-origin subpre x hijacks. What if today's RPKI was hardened against these hijacks, by converting every existing ROA into a minimal ROA that does not use maxLength? To convert each ROA in our RPKI dataset into a minimal ROA with no maxLength, we (1) identify the IP pre xes that are made valid by that ROA and are announced in our BGP dataset, and (2) modify the ROA so that it contains only those IP pre xes. We have the same number of ROAs, but now (instead of the status quo 39,949 tuples) we have a total of 52,745 (IP pre x, AS)-pairs. We use compress_roas to compress these 52,745 pairs to obtain 49,308 (IP pre x, maxLength, origin AS)-tuples, for a compression of 6.5%. Even with compress_roas, we still have 23% more tuples than the status quo; however, the status quo is vulnerable to forged-origin subpre x hijacks, and the scenario we just evaluated is not. RPKI in full deployment. We consider a future full deployment scenario where the RPKI is hardened against forged-origin subpre x hijacks. That is, we assume every IP pre x announced in our BGP dataset is validated by a minimal ROA that does not use maxLength. Our BGP dataset has 776,945 (IP pre x, AS) pairs. This is exactly the number of (IP pre x, AS) pairs contained in ROAs if the RPKI used only minimal ROAs and no maxLength. Applying compress_roas gives 730,008 (IP pre x, length, maxLength)-tuples. This is very close to the lower bound of 729,371 tuples for the full-deployment scenario with maximally-permissive ROAs (which is vulnerable forged-origin pre x hijacks; see §6). This result is consistent across all measurements; see Figure 3b .
Thus, if today's RPKI eliminated maxLength and started using minimal ROAs (to immune against forged-origin subpre x hijacks), we would see some increase (23%) in the number of PDUs that must be processed by routers. In a future RPKI deployment, however, this increase becomes insigni cant: using minimal ROAs along with our compress_roas software gives us almost the optimal number of PDUs.
Computational overhead. We tested the compress_roas utility on an Intel i7-6700 machine. Compressing today's (partiallydeployed) RPKI took 2.4 seconds and required 19MB of memory, while the full-deployment scenario took 36 seconds and 290MB memory. Performance could be improved by parallelizing across tries.
Summary. We have shown how to compress away some of the blowup in PDU lists that would result from moving that minimal ROAs that do not use maxLength.
RECOMMENDATIONS
System complexity is a key challenge for the RPKI, especially because it can lead to security vulnerabilities and errors in deployment [8, 26] . As of June 1, 2017 just 12% of pre xes in the RPKI use maxLength. But, almost all of these pre xes are in ROAs that are not minimal, and thus vulnerable to forged-origin subpre x hijacks. These hijacks are as harmful as the traditional subpre x hijacks that the RPKI is designed to prevent. Fortunately, this problem is fairly easy to x without any changes to the RPKI. Today, most network operators con gure their ROAs through interfaces provided by their local Regional Internet Registry (RIR) [3-5, 12, 23] . These interfaces typically ask the operator to input a tuple of (pre x, maxLength, AS). This makes it easy for operators, that are not well-versed in the subtleties of the RPKI, to choose a maxLength that opens themselves up to attacks. We therefore recommend that these user interfaces steer operators towards con guring ROAs that (1) do not use maxLength and (2) are minimal, i.e., that explicitly enumerate the set of IP pre xes that an AS actually originates in BGP. Indeed, some of the UIs (e.g., [23] ) already help operators to con gure minimal ROAs, by using data from BGP looking glasses [2] to inform operators about the set of pre xes that their AS originates in BGP. The option to con gure maxLength directly could be made available for "expert users", but should come with a warning of the risks of forged-origin subpre x hijacks. That way, operators that choose to con gure non-minimal ROAs (in order to e.g., allow for exible pre x deaggregation) can do so deliberately, with an understanding of the risks.
This change is backwards compatible, since it need not alter the behavior of software that validates ROAs. That said, if operators wish to limit the impact of this change on router performance (because, by avoiding maxLength, ROAs might include a larger set of IP pre xes, see §7), operators can use our compress_roas software in the toolchain described in §7.1.
In sum, using minimal ROAs and avoiding the maxLength attribute makes the RPKI simpler, less error prone, and more secure. We are currently preparing an IETF best current practice (BCP) document with these recommendations [10] .
